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I. INTRODUCTION 
Delaware has long been at the “cutting-edge” in resolving commercial 
disputes and providing contemporary statutory corporate governance principles.1  
The Corporate Council, an arm of the Delaware State Bar Association, meets 
annually to update the Delaware corporation law as needed, in order to provide its 
chartered corporations with significant advantages over corporations chartered 
elsewhere.2  Accordingly, 51% of the publicly traded companies in the United 
States, and 61% of the Fortune 500 companies are chartered in Delaware.3  
In April 2009, in order to preserve Delaware’s pre-eminence in offering cost-
effective dispute resolution, the Corporate Council set forth an initiative, which the 
Delaware State Legislature adopted into statute, that amended the rules governing 
the Court of Chancery to permit the court to arbitrate disputes upon consent of the 
                                                            
* Pepperdine University School of Law J.D. Candidate 2014 
1 H.R. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009); Myron T. Steele, Chief Justice, Del. 
Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship, & the Law Symposium: 
Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the Future Holds For Large Business Disputes and How It 
Will Affect M&A Deals (Oct. 30, 2012), in 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 375, 376. 
2 Steele, supra note 1.  
3 Id. 
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parties.4  The genesis of the initiative was the presumption that the arbitration 
program was one that was “needed and desired by the business community” as an 
alternative to otherwise expensive litigation.5  The arbitration program, in addition, 
was believed to provide a suitable forum for international disputants because it 
would guarantee participants that disputes would be arbitrated by widely 
recognized and competent business court judges, who are familiar with the laws 
that govern business agreements and, additionally, it would provide an award 
enforceable in other nations.6 
The arbitration program has not, however, been without critics.  The 
cornerstone of the arbitration program, as with all arbitration, is confidentiality.7  
Because the arbitration program is confidential, critics have argued that it creates a 
“secret court” and violates the First Amendment right of access to court 
proceedings.8 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”9  The Fourteenth 
Amendment extends these prohibitions to the states and bars government 
interference with either the speaker or the listener.10   
A. Litigation 
In 1980, through the splintered opinions comprising Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia, the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment entitles the 
public and press the right to attend criminal trials.11  In Richmond Newspapers, the 
Supreme Court reviewed a Virginia trial court’s decision to exclude the public and 
press from a murder trial.12  In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice Burger traced 
the historic practice of open criminal trials from the earliest recorded proceedings 
in Anglo-American history,13 and concluded that such practice was “unbroken”, 
and “uncontradicted.”14  Further, the Chief Justice described several public 
benefits that were derived from the practice of openness, including honesty from 
witnesses and reasoned decision making from jurists.15  Because the Court found 
                                                            
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(a) (2009). 
5 Steele, supra note 1, at 376-377. 
6 Id.  
7 ROBERT J. NIEMIC ET AL., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR 93–94 (2001) 
(“Confidentiality is generally considered a bedrock principle for most ADR procedures.  Thus, 
participants in court-based ADR are usually assured at the outset of the process that their 
communications will be kept confidential.”), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/ 
lookup/ADRGuide.pdf/$file/ADRGuide.pdf. 
8 Steele, supra note 1, at 378, 382. 
9 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
10 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
11 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). 
12 Id. at 555. 
13 Id. at 556. 
14 Id. at 573. 
15 Id. at 556. 
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that criminal trials were historically open to the public and that such openness 
promoted public benefits, it found that the First Amendment protects the public’s 
right of access to such historically open proceedings.16 
Through Circuit Court opinions, the holding of Richmond Newspapers has 
been extended to grant the public the right of access to civil litigation, granted that 
there is no important countervailing interest.17  In Publicker Industries, Inc. v. 
Cohen, the Third Circuit explained that, similar to criminal trials, civil trials have 
historically been presumed to be open to the public in the Anglo-American legal 
system.18  The Third Circuit subsequently opined that many of the same rationales 
supporting the openness of criminal trials applied equally to civil trials.19 
B. Experience and Logic Test 
The Third Circuit has adopted the experience and logic test to determine if 
there is a public right of access to a particular proceeding or record, if there is no 
prior precedent.20  Under this test, when a court assesses a claimed First 
Amendment right of access, it must consider “[1] whether the place and process 
have historically been open to the press and general public . . .  [and] [2] whether 
public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular 
process in question.”21  The two prongs, known as the “experience test” and the 
“logic test” respectively, must both be satisfied to sustain a constitutional challenge 
under the First Amendment.22 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Facts 
On October 25, 2011, the Delaware Coalition for Open Government 
(“DelCOG”) filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware, alleging that the Delaware arbitration proceeding violated the First 
Amendment right of access. 23   
The Delaware arbitration procedure is ultimately adjudicatory, however, 
settlement alternatives and non-adversarial options for resolution are embedded in 
the program and are encouraged at “nearly every stage.”24  In order to utilize the 
                                                            
16 Id. at 580. 
17 Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984). 
18 Id. at 1068–69. 
19 N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 217 (3d Cir. 2002). 
20 Id. at 208–09. 
21 Press-Enter. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). 
22 See id. at 201–02. 
23 Complaint at 1, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del. 2012) (No. 11–
01015), 2011 WL 5042086. 
24 Del. Coal. for Open Gov't v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 503 (D. Del. 2012); see DEL. CH. CT. R. 
96(d)(3) (requiring that during the telephonic preliminary conference, and at the telephonic preliminary 
hearing, the parties must discuss “whether mediation or other non-adjudicative methods of dispute 
resolution might be appropriate.”); DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(d) (The parties “may agree at any stage of the 
arbitration process to submit the dispute to the Court for mediation.”); DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(e) (“The 
parties may agree, at any stage of the arbitration process, to seek the assistance of the Arbitrator in 
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arbitration, a party must meet several requirements.  First, the parties must consent 
to participate in arbitration at the time the dispute is submitted to the court.25  
Second, at least one party to the dispute must be a business entity and one party 
must be a citizen of the state of Delaware, although the same party can satisfy both 
requirements.26  Third, if a plaintiff solely pursues monetary damages, the amount 
in controversy must exceed one million dollars.27  Because the Court of Chancery 
has traditionally limited equitable jurisdiction, Chancery arbitration allows some 
parties to access Chancery Court Judges when they would otherwise be unable to 
do so.28 
The Court of Chancery adopted Rules 96, 97, and 98 on January 5, 2010 in 
order to administer the arbitration proceedings.29  In accordance with these rules, 
parties seeking to arbitrate their dispute must file a petition with the Register in 
Chancery.30  Subsequently, the Chancellor appoints a Chancery Court judge to 
preside over the case as an arbitrator.31  The arbitrator holds a preliminary 
conference within ten days of the petition’s filing,32 a preliminary hearing as soon 
as practicable,33 and a hearing approximately ninety days after the petition’s 
filing.34 
Both parties, including at least one representative on each side with the 
authority to resolve the matter, are required to participate in the arbitration.35  Prior 
to the hearing, the parties and arbitrator together can agree to modify and adopt 
additional rules for the arbitration.36  If no agreement is reached, Chancery Court 
Rules 2637 apply by default.37   
While the arbitrator does have the power to issue interim, interlocutory, or 
partial rulings, orders, and awards, they are not enforced by the power of the state 
                                                            
reaching settlement with regard to the issues identified in the petition prior to a final decision from the 
Arbitrator.”). 
25 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 347 (2009).  There is no requirement that the parties have an 
agreement to arbitrate their disputes prior to the dispute arising.  Id. 
26 Id. § 347(a)(2)–(3).  Neither party, however, may be a consumer.  Id. § 347(a)(4).  A consumer is 
defined as an individual who purchases or leases merchandise for personal use.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit 6 § 
2731(1). 
27 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 10, § 347(a)(5).  If a plaintiff pursues an equitable remedy, even if in 
conjunction with monetary damages, there is no amount in controversy criteria.  Id.  
28 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (citing Kevin F. Brady & Francis G.X. 
Pileggi, Recent Key Delaware Corporate and Commercial Decisions, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 421, 456 
(2010)). 
29 DEL. CH. CT. RS. 96–98. 
30 Id. 97(a).  The petition certifies that the jurisdictional requirements are met and states the nature 
of the dispute, the claims contended, and the remedies sought.  Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 
2d at 495. 
31 DEL. CH. CT. R. 96(d)(2). 
32 Id. 97(c).  
33 Id. 97(d).  At the preliminary hearing, the parties and the arbitrator discuss the claims of the 
dispute, the remedies sought, the defenses asserted, the legal authorities to be relied on, the scope of 
discovery, the evidence to be presented at the arbitration hearing, and “the possibility of mediation or 
other non-adjudicative methods of dispute resolution.”  Id. 96(d)(4). 
34 Id. 97(e). 
35 Id. 98(a). 
36 Id. 96(c). 
37 Id.  
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in the same way that a court award would be.38  The arbitrator may issue a final 
award after the hearing, granting “any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems 
just and equitable and within the scope of any applicable agreement of the 
parties.”39  While it is not made public,40 a final judgment or decree is entered in 
accordance with the award, and is enforced as any other judgment.41  The award 
may be appealed, but only on the limited grounds available under the Federal 
Arbitration Act.42  At this point, a record of the proceedings may be made public.43 
Following disclosure by Advanced Analogic Technologies, Inc. that it had 
initiated an arbitration proceeding in the Court of Chancery, DelCOG filed its 
complaint against the Delaware Court of Chancery judges.44  Both parties moved 
for judgment on the pleadings.45 
B. Analysis 
In her opinion, Judge McLaughlin, a Pennsylvania judge sitting by 
designation in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, 
assessed whether Chancery arbitration offended the First Amendment right of 
access.  Following a statement of facts and procedural history, Judge McLaughlin 
established that before the court could consider the experience and logic test, it had 
to address a threshold question: whether Delaware implemented a form of 
commercial arbitration sufficiently distinguishable from a trial that the court must 
apply the experience and logic test, or whether it created a procedure sufficiently 
similar to a trial, such that the court must apply the precedent established Publicker 
Industries.46  By comparing the tenets of arbitration with those of civil litigation, 
the court reached the conclusion that the procedure was comparable to civil 
                                                            
38 See id. 98(f)(2).  While the holding in Delaware Coalition for Open Government suggests that 
these orders “bind the parties much as any court orders would,” Del. Coal. For Open Gov’t v. Strine, 
894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 503 (D. Del. 2012), a reading of the Rules indicates otherwise.  Compare DEL. 
CH. CT. R. 98(f)(2) (“In addition to a final award, the Arbitrator may make other decisions, including 
interim, interlocutory, or partial rulings, orders, and awards.”), with DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(f)(3) (“Upon 
the granting of a final award, a final judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity therewith and be 
enforced as any other judgment or decree.”).  If all awards under Rule 98(f) were intended to be 
enforced as any other judgment, the clause would not have only appeared in subsection (3).  This is 
consistent with section 349(c) of the Delaware Code, which provides that either party may apply to the 
Supreme Court of Delaware to “enforce an order of the Court of Chancery,” which would be an 
irrelevant provision if all orders were already enforceable by state power.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 
349(c) (2009) (emphasis added).   
39 DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(f)(1) (emphasis added). 
40 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(b) (“Arbitration proceedings shall be considered confidential and 
not of public record until such time, if any, as the proceedings are the subject of an appeal.”). 
41 DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(f)(3). 
42 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(c).  An arbitration judgment can only be vacated if there is a 
showing of fraud, corruption, undue means in procuring the award, partiality, corruption, certain 
misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, or the arbitrator exceeded his powers or failed to make a final 
award.  9 U.S.C. § 10(a).  An arbitration award cannot be vacated on the showing of legal error.  Id. 
43 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(b). 
44 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494 (D. Del. 2012); Defendants’ 
Opening Brief in Support of their Motion For Judgment on the Pleadings at 9, Del. Coal. for Open 
Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (No. 11–01015), 2011 WL 6401166 [hereinafter Defendants’ Opening 
Brief].  
45 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 494. 
46 Id. at 500. 
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litigation and, as such, it was “not necessary to reiterate the thorough analysis of 
the experience and logic test performed by the Court of Appeals in Publicker 
Industries.”47  Rather, the court concluded that the right of access applies to the 
Delaware proceeding.48 
i. Chancery Arbitration is Analogous to Civil Litigation 
The court first turned to the threshold question of whether Chancery 
arbitration is sufficiently distinguishable from civil litigation, such that the court 
would be required to apply the experience and logic test.49  Upon a comparison of 
arbitration and litigation, the court found that the Delaware proceeding, while 
labeled arbitration, is essentially a civil trial.50  The court proffered four primary 
arguments for this conclusion.51  
First, the court found that the Delaware proceeding is analogous to a civil 
trial because the Chancellor, and not the parties, has the duty to designate the 
specific judge to arbitrate the dispute.52  As such, the court found that the 
proceeding is readily distinguishable from arbitration, given that the “essence of 
arbitration” is that the parties voluntarily agree “to resolve their dispute through a 
decision maker of their choosing.”53   
Second, the court concluded that the Delaware proceeding is similar to 
litigation because “many of the same rules governing discovery in the Chancery 
Court apply to the arbitration.”54  The court noted that because parties to an 
arbitration may craft their own procedures, while parties to civil litigation must 
“follow[] the court’s procedures and guidelines,” the Delaware proceedings are 
distinguishable from arbitration and similar to civil litigation.55   
Third, the court posited that the Delaware proceeding modeled a civil trial 
because a sitting judge, in his duties as a public officer,56 presides over the 
                                                            
47 Id. at 504. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 500. 
50 Id. at 502. 
51 Id. at 502–03. 
52 Id. at 502. 
53 Id. at 500 (quoting Dluhos v. Strasber, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003)).  It is recognized, 
however, that if the parties to the dispute agree to have a third party designate the arbitrators, the parties 
are still choosing their arbitrator.  Davis v. Forshee, 34 Ala. 107, 109 (1859), disapproved of on other 
grounds, Vines v. Crescent Transit, Inc., 267 Ala. 232, 234 (1958).  
 The fact that in this case the arbitrators were named and chosen by the clerk of 
the court, cannot alter the principle. This power was expressly conferred on him 
by the terms of the submission; he acted as the agreed agent of both of the 
parties; and we must presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the 
persons selected were satisfactory to the parties litigant. The maxim applies, qui 
facit per alium, facit per se. 
Davis, 34 Ala. at 109.  
54 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 502. 
55 Id. at 500.  Conversely, arbitrations are characterized by the parties’ ability to “craft arbitrations 
to their specific needs,” and “design the applicable procedural rules.”  Id. (citing Murray S. Levin, The 
Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration and the Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 105, 
106 (1997)). 
56 Id. at 501.  Specifically, the sitting judge “conducts the proceedings in the Chancery courthouse, 
with the assistance of Chancery Court staff,” and is not compensated privately.  Id. at 503. 
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arbitration.  The court observed that “[e]ven with the proliferation of alternative 
dispute resolution in courts, judges in this county do not take on the role of 
arbitrators,”57 and further indicated that “the judge’s public role and obligations 
prevent a sitting judge from acting as an arbitrator for even consenting parties.”58  
The court distinguished the Delaware proceeding from court-annexed arbitrations 
because in such arbitrations, third parties, often lawyers, sit as arbitrators.59  While 
the court admitted that magistrate judges are permitted by statute to oversee court-
annexed arbitrations, it also noted that there are no records of such an instance.60  
Noting that “[a] judge bears a special responsibility to serve the public interest,” 
and that that obligation in addition to the public role of that job, “is undermined 
when a judge acts as an arbitrator bound only by the parties’ agreement,” the court 
concluded that a sitting judge is fundamentally different than an arbitrator.  As 
such, the court found that the Delaware proceeding mirrors litigation.61 
Fourth, the court determined that because the judge’s final arbitration award 
results in an enforceable judgment, the Delaware proceeding is dissimilar to 
arbitration, where parties cannot enforce compliance except by pursuing 
enforcement through a court.62 
Determining that the Delaware proceeding is a civil judicial proceeding, 
rather than an arbitration, the court did not find it necessary to reiterate the analysis 
of the experience and logic test performed by the Court of Appeals in Publicker 
Industries.63  Rather, it concluded that the public benefits of openness64 were not 
outweighed by the speculation that parties would arbitrate their disputes in other 
available private fora.65  Accordingly, the court concluded that the First 
Amendment right of access applies to the Delaware proceeding and that the 
portions of law that make the proceeding confidential violate that right.66 
IV. CRITIQUE 
While the court addressed several similarities between Chancery arbitration 
and civil litigation, it did not address the fundamental differences.67  First, 
Chancery arbitration is fundamentally different than civil litigation because it 
requires consent.68  Unlike litigation, in which a plaintiff may bring a suit against 
                                                            
57 Id. at 502 (citing ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 29–34 (1996)). 
58 Id. (citing Elliott & Ten Eyck P’ship. v. Long Beach, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 140 (Ct. App. 1997); 
Heenan v. Sobati, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532 (Ct. App. 2002)). 
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 503. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 503–04. 
64 Id. at 504.  Such benefits include public education about important legal and social issues, public 
scrutiny that discourages perjury and promotes confidence in the integrity of the courts, and public 
confidence that court proceedings are fair.  Id.  
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 See generally id. 
68 See DEL. CH. CT. R. 97(a)(3) (providing that the arbitration process is commenced by a petition, 
which “must also contain a statement that all parties have consented to arbitration by agreement or 
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an unwilling defendant and may have judgment entered in his favor by default if 
the defendant fails to appear, both parties to Chancery arbitration must consent to 
the procedure at the time of filing.69  Accordingly, in Chancery arbitration, no 
party may be compelled to attend against its wishes, nor may either be subject to a 
judgment without a fair opportunity to be heard.70  Because jurisdiction for 
Chancery arbitration does not extend to non-consenting parties, the legal rights and 
obligations of those parties cannot be affected in the same way as in litigation.71  
This distinction so substantially limits the power and jurisdiction of the Court of 
Chancery that it would be improper to characterize Chancery arbitration as a “non-
jury trial.”72   
Second, as a natural extension of consent, Chancery arbitration is 
fundamentally different than civil litigation because the authority of the decision 
maker is derived from a private agreement and not from the public.73  
Consequently, while a judge overseeing a civil trial is limited by precedent, a judge 
to Chancery arbitration is limited by the scope of the parties’ agreement.74  The 
court deciding Delaware Coalition for Open Government contends that “[t]he 
parties’ consent cannot alter the judge’s obligation in his public role as a judicial 
officer.”75  At its heart, this argument addresses a public policy concern that a 
sitting judge, acting in his capacity as a judicial officer, may issue a private ruling 
that, in effect, limits his accountability to the public.76  There is, however, nothing 
revolutionary about a sitting judge serving as an arbitrator.  Historically, sitting 
                                                            
stipulation . . . .”). 
69 Id. 
In court, a failure to appear or file a written response to pleadings can result in a 
default judgment.  The concept of a default judgment is not recognized in 
arbitration. In arbitration, if the respondent does not appear, the claimant must 
still sustain its burden of proof and submit evidence sufficient to sustain the 
award. 
 John Arrastia, Jr. & Christi L. Underwood, Arbitration v. Litigation: You Control The Process v. The 
Process Controls You, 64 DISP. RESOL. J. 31, 34 (2009–2010). 
70 DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(a) (“At least one representative of each party with an interest in the issue or 
issues to be arbitrated and with authority to resolve the matter must participate in the arbitration 
hearing.”) (emphasis added). 
71 Compare DEL. CH. CT. R. 97(a)(3) (providing that the arbitration process is commenced by a 
petition, which “must [] contain a statement that all parties have consented to arbitration by agreement 
or stipulation. . . .”), and DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(a) (“At least one representative of each party with an 
interest in the issue or issues to be arbitrated and with authority to resolve the matter must participate in 
the arbitration hearing.”), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (“When a party against whom a judgment for 
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, . . . the clerk must enter the party’s 
default.”), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1) (“[T]he clerk . . . must enter judgment . . . against a defendant 
who has been defaulted for not appearing and who is neither a minor nor an incompetent person.”). 
72 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494 (D. Del. 2012); See FED. R. CIV. 
P. 55(b)(1) (The clerk “must enter judgment . . . against a defendant who has been defaulted for not 
appearing and who is neither a minor nor an incompetent person.”); Phoceene Sous-Marin, S.A. v. U.S. 
Phosmarine, Inc., 682 F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1982) (“It is firmly established that the courts have 
inherent power to . . . enter a default judgment to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the 
integrity of their orders.”); Arrastia & Underwood, supra note 69. 
73 Steele, supra note 1, at 379. 
74 See DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(f)(1) (“The Arbitrator may grant any remedy . . . within the scope of any 
applicable agreement of the parties.”); Arrastia & Underwood, supra note 68. 
75 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 503. 
76 See id. at 503 (“The public does not know the factual findings the judge has made or what legal 
rules the judge is, or should be, applying to these arbitrations.”). 
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judges have rendered binding decisions outside of open court by party 
agreement.77  Further, “[t]he American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct allows arbitration by judges as part of their official duties.”78  Finally, the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 permits sitting magistrate judges to 
serve as arbitrators in court-sponsored arbitrations, which may result in binding 
judgments.79  This notion that a judge may serve as an arbitrator is consistent with 
the fact that many judicial activities aimed at resolving the dispute prior to 
litigation are conducted outside of the public’s purview.80  Given that it is not in 
violation of public policy for a sitting judge to serve as an arbitrator, the court 
deciding Delaware Coalition for Open Government was wrong to rely so heavily 
on the proposition that a sitting judge, by public interest, must necessarily act 
differently than an arbitrator.  Because the judges in Chancery arbitration do serve 
the function of arbitrators, as they are limited in their decision by the scope of the 
parties’ agreement, Chancery arbitration cannot be likened to civil litigation. 
Third, Chancery arbitration is fundamentally different than civil litigation 
because the rules may be modified by the participants.81  While Chancery Court 
Rules 26–37 apply to the arbitration by default, prior to the hearing, the parties and 
arbitrator together can agree to modify and adopt additional rules for the 
arbitration.82  Because Chancery Court Rule 45 does not govern the arbitration, the 
parties are required to create their own rules for discovery matters such as the 
procedure for issuing subpoenas.83  This flexibility and choice is often recognized 
                                                            
77 JOHN T. MORSE, JR., THE LAW OF ARBITRATION AND AWARD 105–06 (1872).  Historically, it 
was common for parties to stipulate that a trial be held before the judge at chambers, functioning much 
like a settlement conference in which the judge would evaluate the merits of the case.  See Beach v. 
Beckwith, 13 Wis. 21, 21 (1860) (holding that “[w]here the parties to an action . . . stipulate that it may 
be tried before the judge at chambers, and the finding be filed and judgment entered with the same 
effect as though the trial were had before the court without a jury, a judgment entered in pursuance of 
such stipulation must be regarded as though actually entered upon a trial before the court”).  In addition, 
at one point, American judges were permitted to be compensated for privately refereeing cases that 
were scheduled on their dockets.  See Dinsmore v. Smith, 17 Wis. 20, 23–24 (1863) (upholding an 
award granted by a judge serving as a paid referee to a dispute that appeared on his docket on the 
grounds that it was analogous to having a case tried before the judge at chambers), overruled in part by 
Hills v. Passage, 21 Wis. 294, 295–97.  While Dinsmore was overruled, it was overruled on the grounds 
that a judge serving as a referee cannot enter a judgment against a party unless the agreement expressly 
provides for it.  Hills, 21 Wis. at 296.  The court in Hills further provided that a judge serving as a 
private referee is primarily problematic only if he is compensated for the services: 
 We know of no law authorizing a judge, even by consent of parties, to refer a 
cause to himself as referee, with a stipulation for and followed by an actual 
payment of fees to him under color of services as referee.  We think such practice 
is against the policy of the law.  If the services are to be regarded as rendered by 
him as a judge at chambers, as intimated in Dinsmore v. Smith, the constitution 
prohibits his receiving fees for such services. 
Id. at 297 (emphasis added). 
78 Steele, supra note 1, at 378. 
79 28 U.S.C. § 653(a), (b) (2012).   
80 Steele, supra note 1, at 380.  For example, there is no public right of access to judicial mediations 
or settlement conferences.  Id. 
81 See Tom Hals, Ruling Bars Private Arbitrations in Delaware Chancery Court: Del. Coalition for 
Open Government v. Honorable Leo Strine, 27 No. 5 WESTLAW J. DEL. CORP. 9, at *2 (2012) 
(“Attorneys . . . praised [Chancery arbitration] for the . . . ability of the parties to craft their own 
procedures.”). 
82 DEL. CH. CT. R. 96(c). 
83 See id. 96(d)(4). 
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as the most axiomatic difference between arbitration and litigation.84  Because 
Chancery arbitration contains the flexibility of private arbitration, it cannot 
properly be analogized to litigation.   
Fourth, Chancery arbitration is fundamentally different than civil litigation 
because an award granted in the arbitration is readily distinguishable from a 
judgment granted in litigation.85  Unlike the interim and partial awards granted by 
judges in civil trials, such awards granted in Chancery arbitration are not 
enforceable by state power.86  As such, a party seeking to enforce the award must 
petition the Supreme Court of Delaware.87  While final awards are binding by state 
power, they vary from judgments awarded in litigation in a more fundamental way.  
Unlike trial court judgments, arbitration awards and orders may only be appealed 
on the grounds recognized under the Federal Arbitration Act.88  This precludes an 
appeal on the merits.89  As such, an award granted in Chancery arbitration is much 
more ironclad than a trial court judgment.90  This difference prevents Chancery 
arbitration from being characterized as a private civil trial. 
DelCOG asserts that these are “minor differences in procedure [and] are not 
a relevant consideration[s].”  It is well recognized, however, that the most 
axiomatic difference between arbitration and litigation is flexibility and choice, 
which is applied to nearly all aspects of Chancery arbitration.91  The fact that a 
sitting judge serves as an arbitrator is not a sufficient distinction to cause Chancery 
arbitration to mirror anything other than arbitration.92  Accordingly, the court had a 
duty to apply the experience and logic test. 
                                                            
84 See Arrastia, supra note 69, at 32 (“The core concept of arbitration is flexibility.”); Thomas J. 
Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation”, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2010) (“The most 
important difference between arbitration and litigation—and the fundamental value of arbitration—is 
the ability of users to tailor processes to serve particular needs.”). 
85 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(c).  
86 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
87 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  
88 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(c).   
89 See 9 U.S.C. § 9, 10(a) (2012).  An award may only be appealed on the following grounds: 
 (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;  
 (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of 
them;  
 (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the 
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent 
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights 
of any party have been prejudiced; or 
 (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them 
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter was not made.  
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012). 
90 Kathleen M. Scanlon, Guidance on Arbitration Awards: ‘Finality vs. Reviewability’, 19 
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 1 (2001) (“The almost ironclad finality of an arbitration award 
has been a hallmark of arbitration.”).  This feature has long been considered a chief advantage over 
litigation, as it promotes faster resolution and cost savings.  Id. 
91 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
92 See 28 U.S.C. § 653(b) (2012).  Court-annexed arbitration is still arbitration, even if a magistrate 
judge serves as the arbitrator.  See id.; Morse, supra note 75, at 105–06 (“If no proceedings are pending 
or contemplated in court, there is of course no objection to selecting a judge to act as an arbitrator . . . . 
[and] [o]n the contrary, it is very common so to do. . . .”). 
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A. The Delaware Coalition for Open Government Did Not Satisfy the 
Experience Test 
Given that Chancery arbitration is not analogous to litigation, the court 
should have analyzed whether arbitration has historically been open to the public.  
For the purposes of satisfying the experience test, a strong historical precedent for 
openly conducting the type of proceeding at issue must be present.93 
Unlike criminal or civil trials, arbitrations have historically been closed to 
the public.94  “In English law . . . it has for centuries been recognized that 
arbitrations take place in private.”95  Not only does the first American treatise on 
arbitration support this proposition,96 but the court deciding Delaware Coalition 
for Open Government, itself, admits that “[a]s the product of private agreement 
between the parties, historically, arbitrations have been conducted outside the 
public view.”97  
The prevalence of privacy in arbitration is more recently recognized by the 
adoption of court sponsored arbitration systems, mediation programs, and early 
neutral evaluation programs in the 1970s.98  By 1998, one-quarter of federal 
district courts and one-half of state courts had either mandatory or voluntary 
arbitration programs as part of their judicial process.99  In 1998, Congress passed 
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, which requires each United States district 
court to “devise and implement its own alternative dispute resolution program, by 
local rule . . . to encourage and promote the use of alternative dispute resolution in 
its district,”100 and to “provide litigants in all civil cases with at least one 
alternative dispute resolution process.”101  Even if the chosen alternative dispute 
resolution program is arbitration,102 the court must “provide for . . . confidentiality 
. . . and . . . prohibit disclosure of confidential dispute resolution 
communications.”103 
Because there is a clear history of arbitration being closed to the public, the 
experience test is satisfied. 
                                                            
93 N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 213 (3d Cir. 2002). 
94 Michael Collins, Privacy and Confidentiality in Arbitration Proceedings, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 121, 122 
(1995) (citing Sir Michael J. Mustill & Stewart C. Boyd, The Law and Practice of Commercial 
Arbitration in England 432–34 (2d ed. 1989)). 
95 Id. 
96 See MORSE, supra note 75, at 116.  
97 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 501 (D. Del. 2012). 
98 Katherine V.W. Stone, Alternative Dispute Resolution, in 1 THE OXFORD INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 131 (Stanley N. Katz ed. 2009). 
99 Id. 
100 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2012).  
101 Id. § 652(a). 
102 Courts may not require participation in arbitration without the parties’ consent.  Id.  Courts may 
not arbitrate constitutional cases, civil rights cases, and cases in which damages of more than $150,000.  
Id. § 654(a).  A party to an arbitration may request a trial de novo for any reason.  Id. § 657(c)(1).  If 
neither party requests a trial within thirty days of the arbitration, however, the arbitration is binding as a 
court judgment and is not appealable on the merits.  Id. § 657(a), (c)(1).   
103 28 U.S.C. § 652(d).  See, e.g., NIEMIC ET AL., supra note 7, 93–94 (“Confidentiality is generally 
considered a bedrock principle for most ADR procedures.  Thus, participants in court-based ADR are 
usually assured at the outset of the process that their communications will be kept confidential.”). 
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B. The Delaware Coalition for Open Government Did Not Satisfy the Logic 
Test 
Even if DelCOG could succeed in establishing the experience test, it would 
not be able to establish the logic test.  The logic test provides that public access 
must play a “significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in 
question” in order for a constitutional challenge to be sustained.104  Any inquiry 
into whether a role is positive must also include an inquiry into whether that role is 
potentially harmful.105  In the instant case, not only does public right of access to 
Chancery arbitration fail to actually provide access to the arbitrations in question, 
it also harms Delaware’s ability to employ a creative dispute resolution process, in 
effect, harming both potential users and the state itself. 
First, pursuant to the logic test, one must look to whether right of access to a 
particular procedure plays a significant positive role in its functioning.106  The 
purported benefits of openness generally include honesty from witnesses, reasoned 
decision making from the fact finders, public education about the judicial system, 
public awareness of social and legal issues, and public confidence in the 
judiciary.107  In some instances, however, public scrutiny can undermine the very 
function of the procedure itself, particularly when the purpose of the procedure “is 
to further an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.”108  Chancery arbitration 
must necessarily occur in private so that parties are free and encouraged to engage 
in non-adjudicative dispute resolution,109 which often requires parties to disclose 
potentially damaging information that, if not for privacy, would otherwise be 
withheld.110  In addition, right of access undermines the cornerstone of Chancery 
arbitration: privacy.111  An enforceable right of access to Chancery arbitration 
would therefore alter the way the process is conducted by impeding the Chancery 
Court’s ability to resolve the dispute.112  Because the function of Chancery 
arbitration is undermined by public access, parties who would otherwise engage in 
Chancery arbitration will instead choose a private, alternative arbitral forum.113  
Accordingly, the dispute will nevertheless be kept from the public’s purview and, 
as such, the benefits of right of access to Chancery arbitration will never 
materialize.  Therefore, it cannot be said that right of access plays a substantial role 
                                                            
104 N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Press-Enter. 
v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. at 8). 
105 See id. at 217 (“[W]ere the logic prong only to determine whether openness serves some good, it 
is difficult to conceive of a government proceeding to which the public would not have a First 
Amendment right of access.”). 
106 Id. at 206. 
107 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 504 (D. Del. 2012). 
108 B.H. v. McDonald, 49 F.3d 294, 301 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that pubic scrutiny in in-chambers 
conferences undermined its very function). 
109 See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 503 (“In addition [Chancery arbitration] 
encourages settlement and non-adversarial resolution at nearly every stage.”); see also DEL. CH. CT. R. 
98(a) (requiring both parties have a representative with decision-making power to be present); DEL. CH. 
CT. R. 97(d) (requiring parties to discuss the “possibility of mediation or other non-adjudicative 
methods of dispute resolution.”). 
110 Steele, supra note 1, at 378. 
111 Id. at 380. 
112 See id. at 378 (“Confidentiality is essential to getting the dispute resolved.”). 
113 Id. 
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in the functioning of Chancery arbitration. 
Secondly, to fully analyze the experience prong, the harmful ramifications of 
the public’s right of access must be assessed.114  Among the potentially harmful 
ramifications of public openness that courts have considered is whether “[f]orcing . 
. . proceedings into an older criminal procedure mold would have a stifling effect 
on a state’s ability to use creative methods in solving its problems.”115  Here, 
Delaware enacted its arbitration statute to “remain at the cutting-edge in dispute 
resolution” by providing a cost-effective and highly efficient program, 116 and to 
offer a creative solution to the concern that local judgments are not enforced 
internationally.117  By requiring that Chancery arbitration be public, thereby 
effectively abrogating use of the proceeding, Delaware entities will be 
disadvantaged because they will not have access to a private, efficient, and 
predictable arbitration in a nationally renowned forum,118 and Delaware, itself, will 
be disadvantaged because it will be greatly hindered in attracting international 
corporations.119  
V. IMPACT 
The court’s holding in Delaware Coalition for Open Government, ordering 
Chancery arbitration to be public, eliminates a substantial opportunity for 
Delaware entities to resolve their disputes in a confidential, predictable, and cost-
efficient manner.120  Ultimately, while business entities resolve their disputes in 
different fora depending upon each dispute’s individual factual scenarios, business 
entities undeniably want access to a competent, expeditious resolution, with 
confidence and predictability of outcome from the chosen process.121  Chancery 
arbitration provided a forum in which parties could tailor the process to fit their 
individual needs and confidentiality concerns, while still providing confidence and 
predictability to clients unfamiliar and weary of private arbitration.122  With the 
order that the arbitration proceeding be open to the public, Delaware entities are 
                                                            
114 N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 206, 200–02 (3d Cir. 2002). 
115 First Amendment Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 473 (3d Cir. 1986).   
116 H.R. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009). 
117 Defendants’ Opening Brief, supra note 44, at 17 (quoting Daniel E. Gonzalez, The Value of 
Arbitration, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, LEADING LAWYERS ON THE ART & SCIENCE OF 
ARBITRATION MEDIATION, & MORE 49–50 (2004) (“The biggest advantage of arbitration overall is the 
ability to enforce it around the world.”).   
118 Steele, supra note 1, at 378. 
119 Id. at 377 (discussing that the General Assembly enacted the citizenship restriction on Chancery 
arbitration because it believed that only those paying dues to be a Delaware citizen should be entitled to 
participate in and benefit from the program).  
120 See Distinguished Visiting Practitioner James Griffin, Address at the Journal of Business, 
Entrepreneurship, and & Law Symposium: Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the Future Holds 
for Large Business Disputes and How it Will Affect M&A Deals (Oct. 30, 2012), in 6. J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 375, 382–83 (describing a transaction where a European entity was not 
comfortable with the American legal system and the potential damages, but was comfortable in having 
a proceeding brought in Delaware by use of the arbitration proceeding). 
121 Steele, supra note 1, at 377. 
122 Griffin, supra note 114, at 386–87 (discussing that clients involved in a negotiation of a major 
acquisition, while comfortable with the Court of Chancery, are uncomfortable with the concept of 
arbitration). 
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forced to forego an innovative dispute resolution mechanism. 
The court’s holding, additionally, eliminates an opportunity for Delaware, 
itself, to gain a competitive edge in the field of international dispute resolution, 
which is developing rapidly in jurisdictions outside of the United States and, 
accordingly, attracting international corporations offshore.123  Currently, at least 
three jurisdictions—Australia, India, and Ireland—have established specialized 
courts to handle international arbitration matters.124  Other jurisdictions have 
developed courts or judges to hear cases to challenge or enforce arbitration 
awards.125  In addition, France and many other nations have enacted new 
arbitration laws “to enhance their attractiveness as seats of arbitration.”126  The 
above nations have adopted these changes in recognition that arbitration is 
important to their economies and to their positions in the world of global 
commerce.127  Because Delaware is unable to maintain its private Chancery 
arbitration program, Delaware must forgo an opportunity to gain a significant share 
in the international dispute resolution market, possibly altering its position in the 
world of global commerce.128   
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The district court should have found that the Delaware Arbitration program 
is constitutional.  The Delaware proceedings are different from constitutionally 
protected court proceedings because they do not involve civil or criminal litigation, 
but rather arbitration.  Arbitration has not historically been open to the public and, 
therefore, the Delaware proceedings should likewise be private.  As a consequence 
of this decision, Delaware entities have lost an opportunity to resolve their disputes 
in a private and predictable forum and Delaware, as a state, has lost an opportunity 
to gain a competitive edge in international dispute resolution.  
                                                            
123 Defendants’ Opening Brief, supra note 44, at 17; see also Monica Shilling, Address at the 
Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship, and the Law Symposium: Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: 
What the Future Holds For Large Business Disputes and How It Will Affect M&A Deals (Oct. 30, 
2012), in 6. J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 375, 385 (“[T]here’s a perception . . . of the American 
litigation system [a]s being not cost-effective, unpredictable, [and] that it takes a really long time, which 
is why you find London as one of the centers of dispute resolution.”). 
124 Defendants’ Opening Brief, supra note 44, at 17. 
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128 Id. 
